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TORTS; COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Amends NRS 15.265, 15.295, 17.225, 17.275, 17.305, 41.141
Repeals NRS 17.215, 17.315, 17.325, 698.310
AB 333 (Committee on Judiciary); STATS 1979, Ch 206
Chapter 206 extends comparative fault to the apportionment of liability
among tortfeasors in multiple tortfeasor cases by reinstating a form of joint and
several liability1 and modifying the law of contribution. 2 Chapter 206 also increases
jury involvement in comparative negligence cases by adding a requirement that the
fact finder return a general verdict of the net sum to be recovered by the plaintiff. 3
Multiple Tortfeasors
Chapter 206 makes a major revision in the law of contribution among
tortfeasors by amending NRS 17.295. 4 Previously NRS 17 .295(1) 5 forbade consideration of relative degrees of fault in determining contribution shares; Chapter 206
deletes this provision.
Chapter 206 also modifies the liability of tortfeasors to the tort victim. NRS
41.14l(e) 6 previously made defendants, in multiple tort cases, severally liable, with
each defendant's liability in proportion to this negligence.
41.141(3) makes such defendants jointly and severally liable. 7

As amended, NRS

Comparative negligence is a rapidly developing area of law. Because its basic
principle is so different from the prior common law, comparative negligence
challenges law makers to create imaginative solutions to the problems of harmonizing the new negligence law with related areas of law.

One of the greatest
challenges is that posed by cases involving multiple tortfeasors. 8 Chapter 206
addresses this challenge.
In 1973, the legislature enacted NRS 41.141 9 and 698.310,10 giVmg Nevada
modified comparative negligence: 11 contributory negligence would no longer bar a
plaintiff's recovery where the plaintiff was not more negligent than the defendants,
but recovery would be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence.
Prior to Chapter 206, NRS 41.141(3) provided that, in actions where recovery is
allowed against more than one defendant, the defendants would be severally liable
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to the plaintiff and that each defendant's liability would be in proportion to his
negligence.12 The assurance that each defendant's liability would be in proportion to
his fault seems to abrogate the common law rule of joint and several liability of
joint tortfeasors whereby one defendant, only partially responsible for a victim's
injury, may be held severally liable for the entire amount of damage.13
The common law rule conflicts with the basic comparative fault principle that
liablility should correspond to the extent of fault. Nevertheless, most jurisdictions
have retained joint and severalliability,14 presumably because of reluctance to have
victims bear the cost of insolvent tortfeasors and fear of escalating collection costs
if separate judgments were awarded.15 However, whe~e joint and several liability is
retained, some provision for contribution among joint tortfeasors must be made in
order to extend comparative fault to liability among them.16 Prior to amendment
by Chapter 206, NRS 41.141 appeared to accomplish this by making codefendants
severally liable for the percentage of total liability corresponding to their respec17
tive negligence.
However, in 1973, the legislature also enacted a new law of
contribution, the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.18 This act was
apparently applicable to comparative fault cases19 but stated "in determining pro
rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability.. their relative degrees of fault shall
not be considered" (emphasis added). 20
With no consideration of fault, the
contribution rule would be the common law type:
tortfeasors. 21

equal division among all

Applying pro rata contribution to several liability of tortfeasors produces some
strange results. If A, B, and C are tortfeasors 55%, 30% and 596 negligent
respectively, with a 10% negligent plaintiff (P) incurring a $100,000 injury, P can
collect no more than $55,000 from A, $30,00~ from B and $5,000 from C. 22- But
since A will then have paid more than his pro rata share of the liability ($90,00<H
3

=$30,000),

he is entitled to contribution from C (who has paid less than his pro
23
rata share).
Thus, the least blameworthy defendant was accorded no better
treatment than the most blameworthy. Moreover, if one of the tortfeasors was
insolvent, f absorbed the entire burden of that defendant's inability to pay. 24
Chapter 206 retai~s contribution among multiple tortfeasors but substantially
alters the guidelines for determining their shares. First, defendants will be entitled
to contribution whenever they have paid more than their equitable, rather than "pro
rata," share of liability to the plaintiff. 25 Excising the term "pro rata" also excises
any connotations of equal division. 26

Chapter 206 further repeals the provisions
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forbidding consideration of fault in the determination of shares, 27 opening the door
to comparative contribution. 28 Now joint tortfeasors will contribute according to
fault. 29
Chapter 206 also adopts a form of joint and several liability. 30 Effective July
1, 1979, defendants are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff, 31 with one
exception. A defendant whose negligence is less than the plaintiff's negligence is
2
only severally liable for dam ages. 3
This modified joint and several liability has been adopted in Texas 33 and
Oregon, 34 and has been much commended in the literature as a system which forces
some absorption of the risk of tortfeasor insolvency by the tortfeasors themselves,
yet protects the slightly negligent defendant from massive liability. 35 Where~ as in
Nevada, the legislature has decided to bar recovery of plaintiffs who are more
responsible for their own injuries than are the defendants, 36 the liability of any
individual less culpable than the plaintiff should naturally be limited. The new law
so provides.
In the example above, where tortfeasors A, B, and C are 55%, 30% and 5%
negligent, respectively, and P is 10% negligent with a $100,000 injury, assume

that~

is insolvent.

Thus, we find: a) C is less negligent than P, and therefore is only
severally liable to P; 37 b) A is m~re negligent than P andls therefore jointly and
severally liable to P; 38 c) i""may either col~ect the w~le $90,000 from A, or collect

$85,000 from A an~ $5,000 from C; 39 and d) if P collects $90,000 fro; A, then A
may seek $5,000 contribution from c, 40 but -no more than that because "n~
tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own equitable

sh~re." 41

On the other hand, one should note the possibility of a plaintiff winning a
judgment against multiple tortfeasors with no single defendant liable for the entire
award. Suppose, for example,

f

has been found 20% negligent and his attorney has

joined eight defendants, all of whom have been found equally but independently
responsible; each 10% negligent. In such a case, each defendant would be severally
liable for the percentage of the damages corresponding to his fau1t. 42 For example,
10% of $100,000 is $10,000, so each defendant would be severally liable for $10,000.

ELIMINATION OF SEPARATE MOTOR VEHICLE PROVISION
Chapter 206 repeals NRS 698.310, 43 which had established comparative negli-
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gence for motor vehicle accident cases using language identical to the general
comparative negligence statute, NRS 41.141. 44 These dual provisions created
ambiguity 45 because of uncertainty as to whether the procedural and multiple
tortfeasor provisions contained in NRS 41.141(2) and (3) were to apply to motor
vehicle cases. 46
PROCEDURE
Chapter 206 adds to NRS 41.141(2)(b) a requirement that the jury return a
general verdict giving the net sum recoverable by the plaintiff. 47 Prior to
amendment, NRS 4l.l41(2)(b) required a general verdict of the damages to which the
plaintiff is entitled regardless of his contributory negligence, 48 and a special verdict
indicating the percentage of negligence attributable to each party,
the net sum could be mechanically calculated by the court.

49

from which

However, the new

requirement ensures that the jury is aware of the relationship between its separate
findings of raw damages and percentage negligence. This questions of whether or
not to inform the jury of the significance of its findings is one over which there is a
50
profound split among the comparative negligence jurisdictions.
Wesley Kumagai
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Id. §§1, 2, 3, 4, (amending NRS 17.225, 17.265, 17.275, 17 .295).
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Id. §4 (amending NRS 17 .295).
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19.
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Since NRS 41.141(3)

defendants are severally liable .•• 11 there appears little doubt that the
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For a contrary view, see Beasley, NRS 17.215 and 41.141--A
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Inter Alia (3) 1 (1979).
20.
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21.
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denotations of the term 11 pro rata11 in the contribution context.
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